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Entrapment and Jacobson v. United
States1 : "Doesn't the government realize
that they can destroy a man's life? "' -2
INTRODUCTION

It has been suggested that the first plea of entrapment3 was raised
in Paradise by Eve 4 when she asserted that "[tihe serpent beguiled me
and I did eat." 5 Her defense "was overruled by the great Lawgiver
.. . [and] this plea has never since availed to . . . give indemnity to
the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code of civilized . . .
ethics, it never will." ' 6 By this definition, the Supreme Court's code
of civilized ethics lasted approximately sixty-eight years.'
"The hallmark of any society that claims to be civilized has to
be . . . its ability to do justice: its ability to apply its rules with equal
favor to the high and to the lowly." 8 For sixty years, the Supreme
Court's ability to administer justice has been closely scrutinized and
heavily criticized for its formulation of the entrapment defense. The
confusion surrounding the defense has become so great that one
recent commentator suggested that entrapment was the product of the
absence of a coherent framework of blame and choice in criminal law
and not the product, as it properly should be, of logically reasoned
analysis based on fundamental legal principles. 9
1. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
2. Dirk Johnson, Farmer Caught in Pornography Trap Feels Vindicated, but
at a Cruel Cost, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1992, § 1, at 10 (quoting Keith Jacobson).
3. "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer,
and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it
except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
4. Board of Comm'rs v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864).
5. Genesis 3:13.
6. Backus, 29 How. Pr. at 42.
7. See supra note 4 and infra note 19.
8. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Civilization, Integrity, and Justice: Some Observations on the Function of the Judiciary, 43 Sw. L.J. 645, 646 (1989).
9. Louis M. Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal
Justice Dilemma, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 111, 113. "[E]ntrapment doctrine is one of a
number of adaptive mechanisms which compensate for our failure to develop a
coherent theory of blame and choice to regulate the imposition of criminal punishment. More fundamentally, the doctrine is a consequence of. the inherent limits on
the ability of government to distribute the social cost of deterring crime in an
equitable fashion." Id.
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In spite of the confusion encompassing this defense, entrapment
is commonly asserted in prosecutions that result from undercover
investigations of such criminal activities as pornography, narcotics,
and governmental corruption. The United States is the world's most
lucrative market for child pornography' ° with an estimated annual
market of two billion dollars." Hence, the government claims that
undercover operations are necessary to rid our society of child
pornography 2 because "[o]f all of the crimes known to our society,
perhaps none is more revolting than sexual exploitation of childen,
particularly for the purpose of producing child pornography.' ' 3 A
fifty-six year old farmer from Nebraska, Keith Jacobson, was caught
in such a sting operation and was subsequently convicted for the
receipt of a magazine which contained pornographic photographs of
children. 4 In Jacobson v. United States, 5 the Supreme Court reversed
his conviction by ruling that Jacobson had been entrapped as a matter
6
of law.'
This note examines the Jacobson v. United States decision. Part
II provides a brief overview of the development of the entrapment
defense. Part III tenders the facts, presents the procedural history,
analyzes the reasoning used in the Supreme Court's decision, and
demonstrates how the Court tailored its analysis to achieve its desired
result. Part III also establishes, by analyzing the facts of Jacobson
against the conventional framework of the due process defense, that
although the Court's decision was inconsistent with traditional entrapment doctrine, the decision may be reconcilable as an implicit
10. S. REP. No. 537, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2935 (1986).
11. Id. at 46.
12. Brief for the United States at *53, Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
1535 (1992) (No. 90-1124), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Supreme Court
Briefs File (citing United States v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131, 1139-40 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Raymond Smith, who supervises child pornography investigations for the Postal
Service, stated that sting operations are necessary because child pornography is "not
something that you discuss with your next-door neighbor or the guy sitting next to
you at the bar . . . [it] is a very private thing." Ruth Marcus, Fair Sting or Foul
Trap?: Child Pornography Investigation Challenged, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1991, at
A8.
13. H. REP. No. 910, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5952, 5953.
14. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1537 (1992).
15. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
16. Id. at 1543. Before action may be taken as a matter of law, the court must
answer a question of law. A question of law is a "disputed legal contention[] which
[is] . .. left for judge to decide." STEVEN H. GIFIS, LAW DICTIONARY 388 (3d ed.
1991).
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application of the due process defense. Part IV discusses the potential
implications that Jacobson will have on the future of the entrapment
defense and, finally, Part V concludes that the inconsistencies between

precedent and the instant case are attributable to the special circumstances surrounding Jacobson.
II.

ENTRAPMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT

17

In the 1890's, the United States Supreme Court alluded to the

possibility of entrapment as a potential defense. 8 However, the Court
did not actually recognize entrapment as a viable defense until 1932
in Sorrells v. United States.19

While posing as a tourist, a Prohibition 20 agent visited the defen-

dant's home.2' The two discovered that they were both ex-members

of the same military unit. 22 During the course of the visit, the agent

asked the defendant if the defendant would get the agent some alcohol

because they were former war buddies.2 3 After three requests by the
agent, the defendant left his home and returned after a few minutes
with a half gallon of liquor. 24 The agent paid the defendant five

dollars for the alcohol. 25 Following an indictment for violating the
National Prohibition Act, 26 the defendant asserted that he was entrapped. 27 The Supreme Court held entrapment to be a permissible
defense. 28 The Court's decision that entrapment was available as a
defense reflected tensions which are still dividing the Court, the federal

see

17. For a comprehensive review of the historical development of entrapment,

PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE (1989).
18. MARCUS, supra note 17, §1.05. These "Decoy

Letter Cases" are discussed
in United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 682-83 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part, 476
U.S. 734 (1986).
19. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
20. Prohibition is the "[i]nterdiction of the liberty of making and of selling or
giving away intoxicating liquors, for other than medicinal, scientific, or sacramental
purposes." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1349 (27th ed. 1965). Prohibition existed nationally in the
United States from the passing of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919 until its repeal
by the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
21. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439.
22. Id.
23. Id.at 440.
24. Id. at 439.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 438.
27. Id.
28. Id.at 452.
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and state judiciaries, and the academic community2 9 over what is the
appropriate method or theory to be used as the basis of this defense.
Sorrells established the theoretical underpinnings of the entrapment defense.3 0 The majority held that the trial court should focus on
the predisposition and criminal design of the defendant. 31 Because the
judicial focus is. on the accused, this has become known as the
subjective theory of entrapment. 32 The Court defined entrapment as
"when the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the
disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission
in order that they may prosecute." 3 Also, the Court cautioned that
defendants cannot complain of appropriate investigations into their
conduct and predisposition. 34 In most situations, the subjective theory
requires the issue of entrapment to be decided by the jury. 35 Justice
Roberts, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone, criticized the majority's approach for its emphasis on the prior reputation or former acts
of the accused instead of focusing on the commission of the charged
crime .36
For twenty-five years, Sorrells stood alone as the Supreme Court's
promulgation on entrapment. In 1958, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
37
the subjective theory of entrapment in Sherman v. United States.
However, Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion developed an alternative known as the objective theory of entrapment. 38 The judicial
focus of the objective theory is "whether the police conduct revealed
29. MARCUS, supra note 17, § 1.06.
30. Id.

31. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
32. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).

"In Sorrells v. United States ...

the Court took what might be called a 'subjective'

approach to the defense of entrapment." Id.
33. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
34. Id. at 451-52. The defendant pleading entrapment "cannot complain of an
appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition ....

If

in consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon himself by reason
of the nature of the defense." Id.
35. "[T]he issue of whether a defendant has been entrapped is for the jury as
part of its function of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused." Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958).
36. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring).
37. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
38. While Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion was the first real pronouncement of the objective test, Justice Robert's scathing attack on the subjective test in
his concurring opinion in Sorrells was the basis for this formulation of the objective
test. See MARCUS, supra note 17, § 3.01.
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in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings
respond, for the proper use of governmental power." ' 39 Unlike the
subjective theory, where the entrapment determination is a question

of fact for the jury, the entrapment decision
under the objective
40

theory is a question of law for the judge.
The philosophical underpinning of the objective theory is that
the entrapment defense is not meant to protect defendants who would

have been "otherwise. innocent."

41 To

the contrary, the supporters of

the objective theory feel that entrapment's purpose is to protect the
government from the illegal conduct of its officers, 42 to perpetuate
the purity of its judiciary system, 43 and to deter future inappropriate

government conduct. 44

The supporters of both the subjective theory and the objective
theory agree that the entrapment defense is warranted on their collec-

tive belief that luring innocent people into criminal activity is an

oppressive abuse of the government's discretion. 45 Whereas the objec47
46
tive theory is preferred by the Model Penal Code, commentators,
39. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Commonly, the
justices will reach the same conclusion regardless of whether the objective test or the
subjective test was applied. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932);
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). But see United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
40. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
41. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 442-43 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Casey v. United States, 276
U.S. 413, 425 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
43. Id.

44. Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the

Entrapment Defense, 73 VA. L.

Id.

REV.

1011, 1044 (1987).

45. Carlson, supra note 44, at 1031.
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2:13. This section states:
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation
with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting such an offense by
either:
(a) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the
belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement that create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other
than those who are ready to commit it.

47. See, e.g., Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies,
Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Joseph Goldstein,
For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed
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and some states; 41 the subjective theory is favored by the federal
judiciary, including a majority of the Supreme Court's justices, and
the vast majority of states.
Turning to the facts of Sherman, a government informant met
the defendant at a doctor's office where they were both being treated
for an addiction to narcotics.

49

After several accidental meetings, their

conversation progressed to a discussion of their mutual experiences
and problems overcoming their drug addictions.5 0 Finally, the informant asked the defendant if he could obtain some narcotics to sooth
the informant's suffering." Initially, the defendant ignored the request.1 2 After a number of appeals, the defendant consented and
obtained drugs for the informant. 3 The defendant was convicted of
buying illegal narcotics. 4 The defendant's conviction was set aside as
the Supreme Court held that the defendant had been entrapped as a
matter of law. 5 The Court, applying the subjective theory of entrapment, found that the government had played on the weaknesses of
an innocent party and beguiled that innocent party into committing
6
crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted.
In 1973, the Court revisited the entrapment defense in United
States v. Russell.5 7 This case involved the government supplying the
defendant with a difficult to obtain, 8 essential ingredient in the6
manufacture of methampetamine5 9 more commonly known as speed. 0
An undercover agent initiated contact with the defendant in an effort
to locate a laboratory where it was believed that speed was being
manufactured illegally. 6' The agent offered to supply the defendant
with the essential ingredient in return for fifty percent of the speed
Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683 (1975); Paul W. Williams, The
Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution,

28

FORDHAM

L.

REVIEW

399 (1959).

48. Approximately twelve states have adopted the objective theory.

supra note 17, § 1. 13.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 370 (1958).
Id. at 373.
Id. at 376.
411 U.S. 423 (1973).
Id. at 426.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.

MARCUS,
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produced.6 2 The agent's offer was conditional on being shown a
sample of the speed and the laboratory where the speed was being
produced. 63 After the agent completed two transactions in approximately one month with the defendant, including one in which he
observed the defendant's production of the speed, the agent executed
a search warrant at the laboratory's location and arrested the defendant. 64 The defendant was convicted by a jury. 65 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction on the basis
that, as a matter of law, an intolerable degree of governmental
participation in the criminal enterprise is an appropriate defense. 66
While a majority of the Supreme Court expressly rejected this attempt
by the Ninth Circuit to broaden the subjective theory of entrapment
formulated in Sorrells and Sherman, 67 the Court conceded that a
situation in the future may present government conduct so offensive
that due process principles would be an absolute bar to criminal
prosecution of the ensnared individual. 68 Though the Court found the
government's conduct in this case was not of a violative variety, 69 it
failed to elaborate on the type of governmental conduct which the
Court would consider sufficiently offensive to preclude prosecution.70
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Johnson7 held
that a court must weigh the following four factors: "(1) the need for
the type of government conduct in relationship to the criminal activity;
(2) the preexistence of a criminal enterprise; (3) the level of the
direction or control of the criminal enterprise by the government; (4)
the impact of the government activity to create the commission of the
criminal activity." 72 Since Russell, there has only been one conviction
overturned by a court under the due process defense. 73

62. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 425 (1973).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 426.
65. Id. at 424.
66. Id. at 424 (citing Russell v. United States, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir.
1972)).
67. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973).
68. Id. at 431-32. Most courts and commentators agree that Russell was the
first case in which the Supreme Court recognized the defense of due process for
extremely outrageous investigative conduct by the government. MARCUS, supra note
17, § 7.05.
69. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432.
70. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
71. 855 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1988).
72. Id. at 305 (citing United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778, 785 (6th Cir.
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Although the Supreme Court in Russell was adamant in its refusal
74
to overrule the longstanding precedent of Sorrells and Sherman, the
majority recognized that the entrapment defense is not of constitutional dimension and, therefore, Congress was empowered to adopt
any substantive formulation of the defense it so desired. 75 The Court
expressed its holding as "[iut is only when the government's deception
actually implants the criminal design in the mind of the defendant
that the defense of entrapment comes into play." '7 6 The principal
element in the entrapment 77defense is the predisposition of the defendant to commit the 'crime.
Although the lower courts have struggled with formulating an
appropriate test for determining the presence of predisposition, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Dion78 surveyed
the various standards used by other circuits and assimilated the various
mutations into a factor analysis. The factors to be potentially balanced
in the resolution of predisposition include: (1) the ready response of
the accused to the offered inducement; (2) the surrounding circumstances of the illegal conduct; (3) the accused's state of mind prior to
the government's suggestion of the charged criminal act; (4) whether
the accused was previously involved in an activity similar to the
charged criminal act; (5) whether the accused had planned the criminal
act before the government's inducement; (6) the accused's reputation;
(7) the accused's conduct during the government's solicitation of the
criminal act; (8) the accused's refusal to commit similar criminal acts
on previous occasions; (9) the nature of the charged criminal act, and
(10) the relative degree of governmental coercion to the accused's
criminal background. 79 Nonetheless, the Russell Court found no reason to review the jury's finding of predisposition because the defendant's concession in the Court of Appeals that the jury finding as to
predisposition was supported by the evidence was fatal to his claim
of entrapment.80
In Hampton v. United States,8 1 the defendant was convicted for
the sale of heroin which he had procured from a government inform1985); United States v. Norton, 700 F.2d 1072, 1075 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 910 (1983); United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980)).
73. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986).
74. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973).
75. Id.
76. Id.at 436.
77. Id.at 433.
78. 762 F.2d 674, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1985).
79. Id.
80. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973).
81. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
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ant.8 2 The defendant initially claimed that acquittal was appropriate
if the jury believed that the drug was supplied by the government.13
On appeal, the defendant stepped away from his entrapment theory
and asserted a violation of due process 84 which, in fact, closely
paralleled the objective theory of entrapment. It has been suggested
that the due process defense "originated from the objective view of
entrapment and effectively replaced it."85 A three justice plurality of

the Court thought the defendant correctly recognized that the case
did not qualify as one involving entrapment.8 6 The plurality also
rejected the defendant's assertion that "the conduct of the law
enforcement agents [was] so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction .... ,,87
The plurality maintained that a due process defense is available
only when the challenged government activity violates some protected
right of the defendant.8 8 Nevertheless, the plurality contended that
82. Id. at 485.

83. Id. at 488.
84. Id. at 488-89.
85. Molly K. Nichols, Comment, Entrapment and Due Process. How Far is
Too Far?, 58 TUL. L. REv. 1207, 1215 (1984).
86. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489 (1976).
87. Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)). The
due process defense is similar to the objective test for entrapment because both focus
on the government's conduct. However, the two differ in that entrapment is normally
a question of fact for the jury, whereas the due process defense is decided by the
judge as a matter of law. Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment
Cases: The Journey Back, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 457, 458-59 (1990). The Courts of
Appeals are not completely convinced that recognition of a due process defense for
government misconduct is appropriate in every context. Compare United States v.
Bontkowski, 865 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1989) with United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265
(7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the Supreme Court's lack of disavowment on the
availability of the due process defense). However, the federal circuits have almost
unanimously recognized the validity of the due process defense. See United States v.
Bradley, 820 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Mazzella, 768 F.2d 235, 237
(8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Dyman, 739 F.2d 762, 768 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985); United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078, 1087 (4th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985); United States v. Belzer, 743 F.2d 1213,
1217 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,.469 U.S. 1110 (1985); United States v. Tobias,
662 F.2d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982); United States
v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d
373, 379 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 149 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
949 (1975); United States v. Kelly 707 F.2d 1460, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 908 (1983). But see United States v. Struyf, 701 F.2d 875, 877 n.6 (11th
Cir. 1983).
88. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976).
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the establishment of predisposition in the defendant not only forecloses the availability of the entrapment defense, but also forecloses
the availability of the due process defense.8 9 To the contrary, the two
concurring justices and the three dissenting justices agreed that proof
of a defendant's predisposition does not bar the due process defense; 9°
where the government's conduct is "sufficiently offensive" 91 or "egregious." ' 92 Whether predisposition bars the defense of due process or
not, the courts have been very reluctant to exculpate an accused based
on this due process defense.93
The final pre-Jacobson Supreme Court case involving an entrapment issue was Mathews v. United States. 94 The defendant, an employee of the Small Business Administration who was responsible for
subcontracting government contracts to small businesses, had been
charged with accepting a bribe in exchange for an official act. 95 A
private citizen, working undercover to assist the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, offered the defendant a personal loan in exchange for
additional subcontracting assignments from the Small Business Administration. 96 The defendant argued that the agent was a friend who
knew of the defendant's dire financial straits and preyed on the
defendant's momentary weakness by telling the defendant that he
would also be helping the agent hide money from his wife. 97 The
defendant attempted to plead entrapment, even though the defendant
refused to admit that he possessed the requisite mental state of the
charged offense;9 or, alternatively, that his acts were procured by the
overt acts of the government." The trial court held that, as a matter
of law, the defendant was not entitled to an entrapment defense unless
he admitted to the commission of all elements of the charged crime.1°°
In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court held that defendants
may deny one or more elements of the crime -and still be entitled to
an entrapment instruction provided there is sufficient evidence to send
89. Id.
90. Id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

92. Id. at 499 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

93. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986), is the only post-

Russell case in which a due process violation was held.
94. 485 U.S. 58 (1988).

95; Id.at 61.

96. Id.at 60-62.
97. Id.at 61.

98. Id.

99. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 61 (1988).
100. Id.at 62.
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the entrapment issue to the jury.' 0' Again, the Court reaffirmed the
subjective test for entrapment by claiming that it has consistently
adhered to the view that a valid entrapment defense has two related
elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal
conduct. 102
In summary, when a criminal defendant raises the defense of
entrapment, the Court, in applying the subjective theory of entrapment, will differentiate "between the trap for the unwary innocent
and the trap for the unwary criminal' ' 0 3 with the principal focus on
the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime.' °4 Predisposition
has been defined as the defendant's inclination to engage in illegal
activity for which the person has been charged. 0 5 In laymen's terms,
a person was predisposed in situations where the person was ready
and willing to commit the crime. °6 If the jury determines that the
defendant had the propensity to engage in the illegal act, then the
entrapment defense will fail. In a minority of states, the courts apply
the objective theory of entrapment.10 7 This theory requires the court
as a question of law to determine whether the police conduct involved
in the particular case fell below standards for the proper use of the
government's power. 08 In contrast to the subjective theory of entrapment, the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime is not an
issue in an application of the objective theory.' °9 The criminal defendant, in addition to the entrapment defense, may contend that the
government's undercover operation was so outrageous as to violate
the defendant's right of due process." 0 This defense closely parallels
the objective theory of entrapment except that the due process standard applied by the courts in examining the government's conduct is

101. Id.
102. Id. at 62-63. Inducement was not an issue in Jacobson. The government
did not dispute that that it induced Jacobson to commit the crime. Jacobson v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540-41 n.2 (1992).
103. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
104. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973).
105. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (6th ed. 1990) (adopting the court's definition in United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986)).
106. Id.
107. MARcus, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
108. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
109. Id.
110. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976)
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so low that only one conviction has been overturned based on the due
process defense."'
In Jacobson, the Supreme Court returned to explore this hazy
morass of criminal law known as entrapment. Unfortunately, the
Court's exploration and explanation of the entrapment defense further
obfuscated this already murky issue.
III.
A.

JACOBSON V. UNITED STATES

112

FACTS OF THE CASE

Jacobson was a fifty-six-year old farmer and school bus driver
from Nebraska."' He lived with his elderly father who relied on
Jacobson for financial support." 4 In February of 1984, Jacobson
ordered two magazines and a brochure from the Electric Moon adult
bookstore in California." 5 The magazines were entitled Bare Boys I
and Bare Boys 11.116 Although the magazines contained photographs
of nude preteen and teenage boys," 7 the boys were not depicted as
engaging in any affirmative sexual activity." 8 The brochure listed
stores in the United States and Europe that sold sexually explicit
materials." 9 At the time Jacobson received these two magazines, it
20
was legal under both federal and Nebraska laws.
Within three months, Congress had passed the Child Protection
Act' 2 ' which illegalized the receipt of sexually explicit depictions of
children through the mail. 22 Immediately after the Child Protection
Act became law, inspectors from the United States Postal Service
111. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986).
112. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).

113. Id. In addition, Jacobson was the treasurer of his church and remained in
that post throughout the entire prosecutorial process. Johnson, supra note 2. While
the majority used Jacobson's military service and meritorious record as a school bus
driver in supporting its holding that Jacobson was an "unwary innocent," it did not
make any mention of his church service. In a not surprising repercussion of his
indictment, Jacobson was dismissed from his job as a school bus driver. Id.
114. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992). Jacobson had to sell 40
acres of the family farm to pay for the costs of his defense. Johnson, supra note 2.
115. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, 1000 (8th Cir. 1990).
116. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1538 (1992).
117. Id.
118. Id.

119. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 468 (8th Cir. 1990).
120. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1984).
122. Id.
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executed a search warrant for the premises of the Electric Moon. 23
During this search, the government discovered Jacobson's name on
Electric Moon's mailing list. 12A

In January of 1985, the government sent a letter to Jacobson
from the American Hedonist Society, a fictitious organization, which
claimed that the Society's members had the right to seek pleasure
without restrictions because these restrictions were based on outdated
puritan morality. 25 In addition to enrolling in the organization, 26
Jacobson returned a sexual attitude questionnaire in which he indicated he enjoyed sexual materials on preteen sex but he also indicated
that he was opposed to pedophilia. 27
For approximately sixteen months, Jacobson was left alone by
the government. 2 After a new "prohibited mail specialist" discovered
Jacobson's name in a file, the government sent a letter to Jacobson
from another fictitious organization, Midlands Data Research. 29 The
letter solicited a response from those individuals who "believe in the
joys of sex and the complete awareness of those lusty and youthful
lads and lasses of the neophite [sic] ages."' 30 Jacobson responded that
he was interested in teenage sexuality. 3 '
The government followed up Jacobson's response to the Midland
Data Research letter with a mailing from another fictitious organization, the Heartland Institute for a New Tomorrow (HINT).3 2 HINT
represented that its purpose was to protect and promote sexual
freedom, including the freedom to make lifestyle choices.' 33 The letter
went on to claim that HINT's position was that the legislative process
should be used to rescind arbitrarily imposed legislation that restricts
sexual freedom. 3 4 In response to a second survey, Jacobson responded
that he had an "above average" interest in "[p]reteen sex-homosexual."'13 Furthermore, he wrote that HINT must be ever vigilant to
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, 1000 (8th Cir. 1990).
Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1538 (1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1538 (1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.

135. Id.
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fight any right wing fundamentalist who attempted to curtail sexual
36
freedom. ,
In its reply, HINT stated that it was lobbying for the elimination
of any legal definitions of "the age of consent."'' 37 This reply also
stated that HINT's funding was to be derived from future catalog
sales which would feature products that Jacobson would find appealing and provocative. 13 Additionally, HINT supplied Jacobson with a
phony list of pen pals which HINT represented as having been
generated from group members with similar responses from the
39
aforementioned survey.
When Jacobson did not initiate any correspondence, the Postal
Service's inspector wrote to him using a pseudonym from the list of
pen pals.' 40 The inspector's letter was written so that its contents
described the fictitious writer's sexual interests in a manner that
reflected Jacobson's sexual interests. 14' Jacobson responded that his
interest was primarily in "male-male items.' ' 42 In responding to a
second letter from the inspector's pseudonym, Jacobson stated that
he liked photographs which featured good looking homosexual males
in their teens and early twenties engaging in oral and anal sex.143 After
44
his second response, Jacobson discontinued the correspondence.'
In March of 1987, approximately twenty-six months after the
Postal Service's initial mailing, Jacobson's name was submitted to the
Customs Service for inclusion in its child pornography sting, "Operation Borderline."' 45 The Customs Service sent Jacobson a brochure
from a fictitious Canadian company named "Produit Outaouais."'46
The brochure advertised photographs of "young boys in sex 48action
fun.' ' 47 Jacobson placed an order which was never delivered.

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1538-39.
139. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1539 (1992).
140. Id.
141. Id. This technique is known as "mirroring." Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. In a post-decision interview, Jacobson stated that his failure to respond
to his pen-pal's third letter was attributable to the fact that he had broken his wrist

in a tractor accident. Marcus, supra note 12.

145. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1539 (1992).
146. Id.

147. Id. at 1544.
148. Id. at 1539.
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The postal inspector subsequently sent Jacobson a letter from a
fictitious organization named Far Eastern Trading Company Ltd. 49
The letter stated that the company had devised a method of getting
pornography delivered to Jacobson without the material being seized
by the United States Customs Service.' 50 Jacobson was invited to send
for more information and the company requested that Jacobson
formally acknowledge that he was not involved in any undercover
operation sponsored by the United States government which was
calculated to entrap the Far Eastern Trading Company, its agents or
its customers.' After Jacobson responded, the government sent a
15 2
catalog.
Jacobson ordered a magazine called Boys Who Love Boys'
which was advertised in the catalog as "11 year old and 14 year old
boys get[ting] it on in every way possible. Oral, anal sex and heavy
54
masturbation. If you love boys, you will be delighted with this.'
With his order, Jacobson included a note which stated "[w]ill order
other items later. I want to be discreet in order to protect you and

me.,,.155

After a controlled delivery of the magazine, Jacobson was arrested. 5 6 While searching his home, the government found Bare Boys
I, Bare Boys II, and Boys Who Love Boys.' The government's search
failed to locate any other materials that indicated Jacobson was
interested in child pornography.'
Jacobson was indicted on one count of receiving through the
mail a visual depiction, the production of which involved the use of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 5 9

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1544 (1992).

154. Id.

155. Id.
156. Id. at 1540.
157. Id.
158. Id.

159. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, 1000 (8th Cir. 1990). He was
charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (1984) which stated that "[a]ny person
who knowingly receives .

.

. any visual depiction that has been ...

mailed .

.

. if,

the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be
punished .

. . ."

According to Daniel L. Mihalko, Manager of Congressional and

Public Affairs for the Postal Service, a total of 161 people were convicted. Postal
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At trial, Jacobson explained that he had been shocked and
surprised when he had discovered that Bare Boys I and Bare Boys II
contained pictures of very young, unclothed boys.'6 Nevertheless,
Jacobson contended that he had not drawn any sexual connations
from the photographs because most of the boys had been featured in
rural or outdoor settings.' 6' Furthermore, he had not been offended
because he believed that the magazine was targeted to appeal to
individuals who aspired to the nudist lifestyle. 62

A jury of nine women and three men returned a verdict of

guilty. 63 Jacobson was sentenced to two years of probation and 250
hours of community service.'"
A three judge panel from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the conviction. 65 While the majority conceded that Jacobson
exhibited a predisposition to receive sexually explicit photographs of
children through the mail, 66 the court held that Jacobson had been
6
entrapped as a matter of law. 67 Based on public policy concerns, 1

Inspections-How Far Is Too Far? (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 2, 1992),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File, at * 13-14. Also, thirty-five instances

of child molestation were discovered. Daniel L. Mihalko, Far From a Clear-Cut
Decision, WASH. POST, May 4, 1992, at A22. Unfortunately, at least four men
committed suicide after the shame of being charged with the receipt of child
pornography had become unbearable. Johnson, supra note 2. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently struck 18 U.S.C. § 2252 as unconstitutional. United States
v. X-citement Video, Inc., No. 89-50556, 1992 WL 367097, at *6-7 (9th Cir. Dec.
16, 1992). The court held that the statute facially violated the First Amendment of
the Constitution because it did not require that the accused know that at least one
of the sexual performers was under the age of eighteen. Id.
160. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1537 (1992).
161. Id. at 1538.
162. Id. The government contended that the magazine could not have seriously
been mistaken for a nudist type publication because "the focus of the camera [was]
squarely on the boy's genitals." Mihalko, supra note 159. However, Jacobson's
attorney asserted that the boys were engaged in skinny-dipping at a river in Texas.
Postal Inspections-How Far Is Too Far?,supra note 159, at

*16.

163. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d at 1000. Jacobson's attorney, in a
post-decision interview, attributed the jury's conviction of Jacobson to the fact that
all of the nine women on the jury had children and, consequently, a verdict of "not
guilty" in a case involving child pornography was extremely unlikely. PostalInspections-How Far Is Too Far?, supra note 159, at *12.
164. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d at 1000.
165. Id. at 1002.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. Although the court recognized that undercover operations are indispen-
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the court contended that a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity was
required by government agents before targeting an individual in an
undercover investigation. 69
Upon granting of petition for rehearing en banc, the Eighth
Circuit joined with the other courts of appeals which had not found
a requirement in the Constitution which mandated that the government have a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing before focusing on
an individual in a sting operation.' 70 In viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government in deciding whether there was
a jury question on entrapment, the court concluded that the govern168. Id. Although the court recognized that undercover operations are indispensable to meet the goals of effective law enforcement, the court held that potential
harms which include "the creation of crime, the entrapment of innocent persons, the
destruction of the reputations of innocent persons, extensive fishing expeditions
among innocent citizens, the creation of an air of distrust amongst colleagues and
acquaintances and the subjecting of government agents to tremendous tons, dangers
and stresses" require such limitations as a reasonable suspicion requirement to prevent
the potential harms from occurring. Id. at 1002 n.2.
169. Id. at 1002. Apparently, the government's brief cited numerous cases in
support of their position that the Electric Moon purchase was sufficient evidence of
predisposition to justify the undercover operation because the majority undertook
the painstaking process of distinguishing all of the cases reaching the appellate level
cited by the government. Id. at 1001. Further, the majority discussed the Congressional hearings that reviewed the ABSCAM sting operation. They noted that reasonable suspicion appeared in the record of each ABSCAM case. Id. at 1001 n.l. The
cases cited by the court which specifically dealt with the reasonable suspicion
requirement were: United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 609 (3d Cir. 1982); and United States v.
Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 941 (2d Cir. 1980). Id. at 1001-02 n.l.
170. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
Apparently, the court felt it needed to respond to the lengthy analysis of the
reasonable suspicion issue in the panel's opinion, United States v. Jacobson, 893
F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1990), because the en banc majority counter-analyzed this issue.
United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 469. The circuits have uniformly denounced
attempts to require the government to have reasonable suspicion that an individual
is involved in some illegality before targeting that individual in an undercover
operation. United States v. Allibhai, 939 F.2d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 967 (1992). See also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1257 (4th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Lutrell, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1558 (1992); United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir.
1989); United States v. Espinal, 757 F.2d 423, 426 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v.
Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 860 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578,
609 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982), appeal after remand,
729 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984); United States v.
Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 940-41 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United
States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817, 824 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1099 (1985).
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ment had only detected the crime and had not manufactured it. 17" ' The
court held that the government presented
ample evidence that the postal inspectors only provided Jacobson with opportunities to purchase child pornography and
renewed their efforts from time to time as Jacobson responded
to their solicitations. Indeed, the panel's opinion recognized

Jacobson's response to a survey mailed to him by the postal

inspectors "indicated a predisposition to receive through the
mails sexually explicit materials . . . [and] justif[ied] the
decision to offer Jacobson the opportunity to purchase illegal
materials through the mail.''

17

2

While the en banc majority held that Jacobson was not entrapped as
a matter of law, the two judges who had constituted the majority in
the panel's opinion filed two separate but equally strong dissenting

opinions. '71

The United States Supreme Court certified for review the question
of "whether [Jacobson] was entrapped as a matter of law ....
In a five-four decision,' 75 the Court delivered an affirmative re76
sponse.1
171. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 470.
172. Id.

173. The basis of Chief Judge Lay's dissent was the reprehensibility of the
government's conduct. Id. at 470-71 (Lay, J., dissenting). Senior Circuit Judge
Heaney based his dissent on the government's failure to have reasonable suspicion
of Jacobson's conduct before targeting him in the sting operation. Id. at 471-76
(Heaney, J., dissenting). In essence, Judge Heaney reiterated the panel's opinion
which he had authored.
174. Brief for the United States at *11, Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
1535 (1992) (No. 90-1124), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Supreme Court
Briefs File.
175. This case was the first 5-4 split of the term which had seen the Court hand
down fifty-two decisions prior to Jacobson. In a bit of a surprise, newly-appointed
Justice Thomas broke ranks from Justice Scalia for only the second time of the term
and joined the majority in throwing out the conviction. Linda Greenhouse, Justices,
in Entrapment Case, Cast a Rare Vote Against Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7,
1992, at Al.
176. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992). While judicial
headcounting is not dispositive of the proper resolution for a case, the final tally in
this case is very interesting. The dissenting judge on the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals' panel opinion stated that there was ample evidence that Jacobson was
predisposed to commit the criminal act. After sitting en banc, the remaining seven
judges of the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals concurred that the government had met
fivetofourits burden of proving Jacobson's predisposition. The Supreme Court voted

1993:4311

C.

JACOBSON V. UNITED STATES

THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

The Court began by recognizing the malignant nature of child
pornography. 77 Citing Sorrells v. United States,178 the majority stated
that there was no disputing the fact that the government may use
undercover agents to enforce the law 179 However, the prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed
to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by government agents.I8 0
Dissenting, Justice O'Connor viewed this part of the holding as
changing the entrapment doctrine.'' According to Justice O'Connor,
the defendant's predisposition had been traditionally evaluated as of
the time the crime was suggested and not at the time of the government's initial involvement.8 2 Justice O'Connor's argument is not
consistent with past entrapment cases such as Sorrells because entrapment occurs "when the criminal design originates with the officials
of the [g]overnment, and they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
commission in order that they may prosecute."'' 3 From this description of entrapment, a court must examine whether the criminal seed
5-4 that a proper showing by the government of Jacobson's predisposition had not
been made. Tallying the votes, twelve judges found that the government had met its
burden of demonstrating Jacobson's predisposition while only seven judges disagreed.
Since five of the seven judges who felt that the government had not made an
appropriate showing of Jacobson's predisposition were justices of the Supreme Court,
they carried the day.
177. Id. at 1540.
178. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
179. Jacobson, 112 S.Ct. at 1540 (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441) ("It is well
settled that the fact that officers or employees of the government merely afford
opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not defeat the
prosecution. Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in
criminal enterprises.").
180. Jacobson, 112 S.Ct. at 1540 (citing United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481,
1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
181. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1545 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
182. Id. at 1544 (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-76 (1958)).
But see Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) (stating "the controlling
question [is] whether the defendant is ... [an] otherwise innocent whom the
government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the
creative activity of its own officials." (emphasis added)). A product is the result of
some operation of human labor or skill. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY

1347 (27th ed. 1965). Clearly,
preinducement conduct of government agents is part of the production process.
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED

183. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
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was planted in the accused's mind by the government and it logically
follows, therefore, that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused's mental desire to commit the crime was in
place prior to the initial contact by the government's agents.
The Court proceeded to establish some parameters for proving
Jacobson's predisposition. 8 4 If the government agents had simply
offered Jacobson an opportunity to order child pornography through
the mail, his entrapment defense probably would not have warranted
a jury instruction8 5 because Jacobson's predisposition would have
86
been demonstrated by his ready commission of the criminal act'
However, the majority held that the evidence in the instant case was
not adequate to prove that Jacobson's predisposition was independent
8 7
of the government's actions.
88
The prosecution's evidence was categorized into two areas.
First, the Court addressed the evidence developed prior to the government's sting operation. 9 This evidence consisted of Jacobson's purchase, by mail, of the Bare Boys I and Bare Boys II magazines.' 90 At
the time, the purchase of the magazines was a legal transaction.' 9'
The Court did not consider the evidence that Jacobson engaged in
conduct which was legal at the time of his participation to be sufficient
to demonstrate that he was predisposed to act in the same manner
after Congress had criminalized the activity.' 92 This statement was
based on the Court's belief that people obey the law even when they
do not like the law. 93 Nonetheless, the Court found that while
Jacobson's legal purchase of Bare Boys I and Bare Boys II may have
suggested a predisposition to view sexually-oriented photographs, the
transaction had very little probative value for establishing Jacobson's
predisposition to engage in the charged criminal activity. 194 The purchase merely indicated that Jacobson was generally inclined to act
within a broad range of conduct which encompassed lawful and
unlawful behavior. 195
184. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1541 (1992).
185. Id.

186. Id.(citing United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952)).
187. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1541.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.

192. Id. at 1542.

193. Id.

194. Id. at 1541.

195. Id. During oral arguments, Jacobson's counsel admitted that if a person
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The second category of the prosecution's evidence was gathered
during the government's undercover investigation. 96 The Court found
Jacobson's responses to the government's mailings indicative of certain personal inclinations, including a predisposition to view photographs of preteen sex. 197 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that these
responses hardly supported an inference that Jacobson would commit
the crime of receiving child pornography through the mail. 9 Justice
O'Connor attacked this part of the holding for redefining predisposition. I9 In her view, the Court added a new requirement dictating
that the prosecution prove the defendant was predisposed to knowingly break the law. 2 ° Further, she contended that this requirement
demanded the government to prove more to show predisposition than
it needed to prove for conviction. 20 1 Justice O'Connor felt that the
Court ignored the judgment of Congress by imposing this specific
intent requirement. 20 2 She was also concerned that the Court substituted its judgment in place of the jury's judgment. 203 In her opinion,
this substitution was improper because one of the functions of the
jury is to prevent arbitrary law enforcement 2°4 by acting as the
25
community's conscience.
The Court found a "strong arguable inference" 2° 6 that the government pressured Jacobson to order the illegal magazine "as part of
a fight against censorship and the infringement of individual rights. 207
smoked marijuana in a country where it is legal, such information is relevant to the
question of whether the person is likely to do so in the United States where it is
illegal. Arguments Before the Court, 60 U.S.L.W. 3393, 3394 (1991). Nonetheless,
Jacobson's counsel clung to his argument that this information, although relevant,
was not sufficient by itself to meet the government's burden of beyond reasonable
doubt. The majority clearly accepted this argument. Jacobson v. United States, 112
S. Ct. 1535, 1542 (1992).
196. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542.
197. Id.
198. Id. In defending the holding from the dissent's attack, Justice White
emphasized that the majority concluded that proof of generalized personal inclinations
was not enough to prove predisposition beyond reasonable doubt. Id. at 1542 n.3.
199. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1546 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.

203. Id. at 1547.
204. Id.
205. Id.

206. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1542 (1992).
207. Id.
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In her dissent, Justice O'Connor's intense scrutiny of the record did
not unearth any evidence indicating that the government had exerted
208
any substantial pressure on Jacobson.
In supporting its inference that the government had pressured
Jacobson into ordering an unlawful magazine, the majority initially
noted that the fictitious organization of HINT's mailing described the
group's function as protecting and promoting sexual freedom. 2°9 The
Court also observed that the mailing stated that HINT intended to
achieve its goals by lobbying legislatures and by promoting dialogue
between concerned individuals. 210 The mailing informed Jacobson that
HINT's lobbying efforts would be financed through catalog sales. 21 ,
The majority felt HINT's mailing "wav[ed] the banner of individual
rights and disparag[ed] the legitimacy and constitutionality of efforts
to restrict the availability of sexually explicit materials .... ",212 While
admitting that the HINT mailing suggested that lobbying efforts would
be funded from catalog sales, Justice O'Connor cited the record from
trial which stated that the catalogs, which had not contained any
references to HINT, were sent from the fictitious organizations of
Produit Outaouais and Far Eastern Trading Company. 2 3 In addition,
she found it probative that the catalogs did not suggest that their
proceeds would be used for political purposes.21 4 Justice O'Connor
also pointed out that the government's sting operation had not claimed
to be organizing a civil disobedience movement which would have
protested the pornography laws by breaking them. 215 This fact was
used by Justice O'Connor to counter the majority's assertion that the
government had exerted substantial political pressure on Jacobson.
In addition to its commentary on the government's urging of
Jacobson to take action in order to protect his individual rights, the
Court noted that two of the government's solicitations "raised the
spectre of censorship. ' 21 6 From the Customs Service's mailing, the
majority observed that Produit Outaouais' reported that its business
which had previously been legal and commonplace had been forced
into becoming an underground, secretive service. 217 Attention was also
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 1545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1542 (1992).

213. Id. at 1546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
214. Id.
215. Id.

216. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1542 (1992).
217. Id.
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drawn to the solicitation's representation that Produit Outaouais took
extreme precautions to insure discreet delivery which had become
necessary because of the global effort to eradicate child pornography. 218 The majority further noted that the Postal Service's catalog
described the global concern about child pornography as "hysterical
nonsense, ' 2 9 decried "international censorship," 220 and assured Jacobson that his order22 could not be opened for inspection witout
judicial authorization. 1
These observations led the Court to conclude that:
[t]he evidence that [Jacobson] was ready and willing to commit
the offense came only after the government had devoted [two
and one-half] years to convincing him that he had or should
have the right to engage in the very behavior proscribed by
law. Rational jurors could not say beyond a reasonable doubt
that [Jacobson] possessed the requisite predisposition prior to
the government's investigation and that it existed independent
of the government's many and varied approaches to [Jacobson .

222

Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's limited interpretation of the evidence. 223 She argued that the government's suggestions
of illegality could be inferred as simply warning potential buyers of
their risk in ordering materials that featured sexually-explicit photographs of minors. 224 With his order for Boys Who Love Boys,
Jacobson included a note which stated "[w]ill order other items later.
I want to be discreet in order to protect you and me." ' 225 This note
indicated Jacobson's intent to order additional items at a later date
and, more importantly, his note suggested that Jacobson knew that
he was involving himself in an unlawful activity. 226 Because she found
the evidence susceptible to more than one interpretation, Justice
O'Connor stated that it was the jury's obligation to make the appropriate interpretation. 227 Therefore, she thought the jury's finding that
218. Id.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1543.
Id. at 1546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.

225. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1546 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,

dissenting).

226. Id.

227. Id.
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Jacobson was predisposed should have been upheld. 221 Justice O'Connor concluded that the Court erred in failing to construe the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government, and that the Court
erred in failing to draw all reasonable inferences in the government's
229
favor.
D.

ANALYSIS

The Court sought to find entrapment as a matter of law and
tailored its analysis accordingly. The only prior case in which the
Supreme Court held that the defendant had been entrapped as a
matter of law was Sherman v. United States. 2 0 The subjective theory
of entrapment affirmed in Sherman defines entrapment as "when the
criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and
they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that
they may prosecute." ' 23' The supporters of the subjective theory
contend that by focusing on the defendant's culpability, the subjective
theory "attempts to distinguish between persons who are blameworthy
and persons who are not . . . [and] that should be the goal of our
law of crimes." 23 2 One of the principal criticisms of the subjective
theory is that an examination of a defendant's predisposition allows
for the introduction of highly prejudicial evidence of the "defendant's
bad reputation or past criminal activities ' 233 which, in turn, may
inflame the jury to convict the defendant because of the person's past
reputation or conduct. In the American system of jurisprudence, the
only appropriate basis for a conviction is the prosecution proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the charged crime as opposed to
convincing the jury that they should vote for conviction because the
defendant is a "bad" person. 23 4
By focusing on the government's conduct, the objective theory
avoids this risk that a defendant would be convicted for simply being
a "bad" person. Further, the proponents insist that this theory is
necessary because "certain police conduct . .. is not to be tolerated

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
(1976).
233.
234.

Id.
Id.
356 U.S. 369 (1958).
Id. at 372.
Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60

MINN.

L. REv. 163, 271

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id.
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by an advanced society. '235 Of course, the objective theory also has
its detractors. One of the principal criticisms is that the objective
theory's focus on the government's conduct236 allows culpable parties
to escape criminal liability for their actions.
The subjective theory is the correct approach for the administration of the entrapment defense. While there is a danger of a jury's
conviction resulting from its belief that the defendant is a "bad"
person and needs to be punished regardless of whether the prosecution
met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the charged
crime, this danger is mitigated by the availability of the due process
defense. Because the subjective theory has this important restraint,
this theory may, to a large extent, also satisfy the concerns held by
the proponents of the objective theory. Thus, the Supreme Court has
been applying the correct theory of entrapment.
Based on Jacobson's ready compliance to the government's solicitation of the criminal act and his prior purchase of child pornography
which indicated that Jacobson was predisposed to receiving child
pornography through the mail, a proper application of the subjective
theory of entrapment should have resulted in an affirmation of the
jury's conviction. Although his entrapment defense should have been
denied, the Supreme Court's reversal of Jacobson's conviction237is
reconcilable as an implicit application of the due process defense.
The first key distinction between Sherman and Jacobson was the
reluctance of the defendant in Sherman to participate in the illegal
conduct. 23 In Sherman, the government informant had to make
numerous requests to overcome the defendant's initial refusal, then
239
the defendant's evasiveness, and, finally, the defendant's hesitancy.
The informant's persistence was necessary to achieve the defendant's
capitulation to the informant's request for the performance of the
charged criminal activity. 240 As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her
dissent, Jacobson "was offered only two opportunities to buy child
pornography through the mail. Both times, he ordered. Both times,
235. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
236. MARCUS, supra note 17, § 1.12.
237. There was no due process argument articulated in Jacobson's brief filed
with the Supreme Court. Brief for the Petitioner, Jacobson.v. United States, 112 S.
Ct. 1535 (1992) (No. 90-1124), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Supreme Courts
Briefs File.
238. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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he asked for opportunities to buy more."'4 Although the Court
conceded that "the ready commission of the criminal act amply
demonstrated the defendant's predisposition,I ' 2 2 the majority ignored
its own statement by overturning the jury conviction.
The Court contended that while Jacobson would not have even
warranted a jury instruction on entrapment if -the government had
simply offered Jacobson an opportunity to order child pornography,
twenty-six months of mailings and communications from the government had negated any opportunity for the prosecution to prove
Jacobson's predisposition merely on the basis of his instant acquiescence to the government's inducement. Unfortunately, the majority
ignored the realities of the child pornography market. Previously
successful law enforcement measures necessitated the development of
a very secretive, underground network from which child pornographers continue to operate.243 Naturally, these clandestine traffickers
are extremely suspicious of newcomers and, consequently, are virtually
airtight against penetration by traditional investigations.
Because
consumers of child pornography risk criminal charges and social
stigmatization if apprehended, they are also extremely cautious of
new purveyors of child pornography. Thus, whether attempting to
investigate distributors or consumers of child pornography, the government has a very difficult time penetrating this market for investigatory purposes.
The second key distinction between Sherman and Jacobson was
the form of the government's contact with the defendant. In Sherman,
the government informant had befriended the defendant before asking
5 Thus,
him to commit the criminal act of obtaining narcotics. 2A
based
on the face-to-face communications with the government informant,
the defendant finally acquiesced to these requests. In contrast, Jacobson was firmly ensconced in the privacy of his own home during his
contact with the government. While the defendant in Sherman would
have had to turn down the request for a favor from a friend in a"
face-to-face conversation, Jacobson only had to place the government's mailings in a garbage receptacle to avoid the criminal activity
or, alternatively, could have avoided the government's sting operation
241. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992).
242. Id. at 1541.
243. Gene L. Malpas, Protect Children from Buyers of Pornography,
WASH. TimES, Dec. 5, 1991, at G2 (Mr. Malpas is affiliated with the National Law
Center for Children and Families.).
244. Id.
245. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 371 (1958).
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by not responding to its solicitations. Indeed, one of the supervising
postal inspectors stated that if Jacobson "had discarded this material,
threw it away, did not answer, did not respond to us, [the Postal
Service] would have folded up our tent and moved on to somebody
else." 2 46
By ignoring the precedent of Sherman, the majority in Jacobson
demonstrated its ability to analyze the evidence in such a manner as
to support its holding. As Justice O'Connor clearly stated, the matter
was settled when the Court conceded that Jacobson's responses to the
various solicitations prior to the criminal act were indicative of
Jacobson's predisposition to view photographs of preteen sex.2 7 The
issue mandated an affirCourt's concession on this predisposition
8
.24
conviction
mation of Jacobson's
In addition, an application of the factor analysis initially promulgated in United States v. Dion 49 supports a finding that Jacobson
was predisposed to commit the criminal act of receiving child pornography through the mails. First, the majority conceded that Jacobson
had readily responded to the government's solicitation of the criminal
25
act. 250 This is the most heavily-weighted factor in the analysis.
Second, while the mailings and communications indicated that the
solicited act was illegal, the sheer number of governmental commu-

246. Postal Inspections-How Far Is Too Far?, supra note 159, at * 17.

247. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1546 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
248. Id.
249. 762 F.2d 674, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1985).
The lower courts have looked to a variety of factors in determining predisposition including: (1) whether the defendant readily responded to the
inducement offered; (2) the circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct;
(3) "the state of mind of a defendant before government agents make may
any suggestion that he shall commit a crime;" (4) whether the defendant
was engaged in an existing course of conduct similar to the crime for which
he is charged; (5) whether the defendant had already formed the "design"
to commit the crime for which he is charged; (6) the defendant's reputation;
(7) the conduct of the defendant during the negotiations with the undercover
agent; (8) whether the defendant has refused to commit similar acts on other
occasions; (9) the nature of the crime charged; and (10) "[tlhe degree of
coercion present in the instigation law officers have contributed to the
transaction" relative to the "defendant's criminal background."
Id. (citations omitted).
250. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1543.
251. United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1197 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1228 (1984) (citing United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th
Cir. 1983)).
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nications sent over the extended period of this case suggests overzealous law enforcement that may or may not have implanted Jacobson's
motivation to order the child pornography. Therefore, this factor
does not favor Jacobson or the government in this case. Third,
Jacobson's state of mind prior to the government's inducement of
the criminal act evidenced by the number of his replies to the
government's mailings support the conclusion that he was very interested in pornographic materials which featured children. Fourth,
although Jacobson ordered Bare Boys I and Bare Boys II when it was
still legal to do so, the mail-ordering of these magazines was an
activity nearly identical to the charged criminal act of receiving child
pornography through the mail. 25 2 Fifth, there are no facts which
suggest that Jacobson planned the criminal act prior to the government's inducement. Sixth, because Jacobson was a decorated veteran, 253 treasurer of his church, 25 4 and a school bus driver with an
impeccable record of conduct, his reputation suggested an "unwary
innocent" in whom the government had implanted the will to commit
the criminal act. Seventh, by continually responding to the government's mailings, Jacobson's conduct during the government's inducement of the criminal act signifies fhat he was predisposed to ordering
child pornography through the mail. Eighth, because Jacobson had
never been previously targeted, this factor is not applicable to this
case. Ninth, although Jacobson had specifically indicated his opposition to pedophilia, 255 the nature of the criminal act for which he was
charged is not one in which a person would commonly become
involved in as a result of curiosity, on the contrary, "[c]hild pornography exists primarily for the consumption of pedophiles. 2156 Tenth,
while the majority stated that the government exerted substantial
pressure on Jacobson, its conclusion is hard to reconcile with the fact
that Jacobson was in the privacy of his home where he was free to
ignore the mailings by disposing of them or by not even bothering to
open these mailings. However, for the sake of objectivity, the majority's conclusion that the government's coercion was much too extreme
252. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
253. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1990).
254. Johnson, supra note 2.
255. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1538 (1992).
256. Malpas, supra note 243 (quoting Ken Lanning who is a behavioral scientist
for the Federal Bureau of Investigations). Pedophiles use child pornography for
gratifying their own sexual desires, reducing the inhibitions of their victims, instructing
their victims on proper sexual performance, blackmailing their victims, and bartering,
trading or selling for other materials. Id.
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for Jacobson's background will be accepted. This balancing test results
in five elements favoring a finding of predisposition, three elements
favoring an absence of predisposition, one element which is evenly
balanced between the two positions and one element which is not
applicable to this case. Most importantly, the key element of Jacobson's ready response to the inducement supports the jury's finding
that he was predisposed. Therefore, Jacobson's conviction should
have been affirmed under the subjective theory of entrapment. Nonetheless, under the due process defense which serves as a limitation on
the subjective theory of entrapment to ameliorate any potential injustices, Jacobson's conviction should have been reversed.
The majority chose to ignore the two critical distinctions between
this case and Sherman, which were Jacobson's eagerness to participate
in the solicited illegal conduct as opposed to Sherman's reluctance to
accept the government's solicitations and Jacobson's solicitation by
mail from faceless entities as opposed to Sherman's face-to-face
pressure from a friend. Instead, the Court chose to concentrate on its
contention that the government exerted substantial pressure on Jacobson to obtain and read pornographic material as part of a fight against
censorship and the infringement of individual rights. 2"1The majority
held that the "processes of detection and enforcement should [not]
be abused by the instigation by government officials . . . to lure
[citizens to commit an act] . . . and to punish them. ' 258 However, by

focusing on the government's conduct in regards to its exertion of
pressure on Jacobson, the Court either implicitly applied an objective
test of entrapment 2 9 or tacitly determined that Jacobson's right to
due process had been violated. Admittedly, the majority framed its
opinion in language that appears to be consistent with the subjective
theory's focus on the defendant's predisposition. Nevertheless, the
subjective test rejects the "strict analysis ' 260 of the manner of the
government's intrusion in favor of an examination of the defendant's
reaction to the criminal opportunity. Yet, the majority continuously
26
alluded to the nature of the government's solicitation of Jacobson. '
Therefore, in what may have been an effort to give the appearance
of remaining committed to the precedent that established the subjective test as the appropriate theory of entrapment in the federal courts,
the Court manipulated and phrased its analysis in terms that specifi257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542.
Id. at 1543 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448.(1932)).
See supra notes 38-44.
MARcus, supra note 17, § 2.01.
Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1541-43 (1992).
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cally parallel the typical language used in entrapment analysis under
the subjective test.
The Court's reasoning is much more palatable if viewed as an
aberrational application of either the objective theory of entrapment
or the due process defense. Because the due process defense has a
higher threshold of tolerance for governmental conduct, a successful
due process defense means an entrapment defense under the objective
theory would also be successful. Therefore, an analysis of this case
under the due process defense, using the factor analysis framework
from United States v. Johnson,262 is a proper starting point to
determine if the Court's holding would have been more appropriate
under either of these two theories.
First, was there a need for the type of government conduct in
relationship to the criminal activity? 263 As previously discussed, the
clandestine child pornography market is extremely distrustful of newcomers and, thus, typical investigations have been unsuccessful in
infiltrating this area of crime. 264 Consequently, undercover operations
such as the one involved in Jacobson are necessary for the apprehension of child pornographers who are involved in this highly secretive
market. On the other hand, mailing two sexual attitude surveys, seven
letters gauging his voracity for child pornography, and two sex
catalogs over a period of twenty-six months to a man who had made
one purchase of similar materials at a time when such material was
legal appears to be an example of overzealous law enforcement. Even
accepting the argument that persons involved in child pornography
are highly suspicious of newcomers, there is no reason why the
government waited in excess of twenty-six months before soliciting
the criminal act. Jacobson's response to the first government mailing
indicated that he enjoyed materials featuring preteen sex.2 65 The Postal
Service should have immediately offered Jacobson an opportunity to
purchase the pornographic materials. Instead, the government chose
to continue communications with Jacobson for an additional twenty262. 855 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1988).
These factors are: (1) the need for the type of government conduct in
relationship to the criminal activity; (2) the preexistence of a criminal
enterprise; (3) the level of the direction or control of the criminal enterprise

by the government; (4) the impact of the government activity to create the
commission of the criminal activity.
Id. at 305.
263. United States v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1988).
264. Malpas, supra note 243.
265. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538.
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six months before offering him an opportunity to commit the criminal
act of receiving child pornography through the mail. While this type
of government action may be essential in any effort to eliminate any
vestiges of child pornography, the actual execution of the sting
operation involved in Jacobson was unsavory and offensive.
Second, was there a criminal enterprise in preexistence? 2" Clearly,
Jacobson had not been involved in any preexisting criminal enterprise
which would ameliorate the unsavoriness of the government's conduct
in this case.
Third, what was the level of direction or control of the criminal
enterprise by the government? 267 The government controlled every
aspect of the criminal enterprise in this case. The government created
and disseminated the propaganda used by the fictitious organizations
in an attempt to convince Jacobson that his sexual freedom and his
freedom of choice had been restricted by arbitrarily imposed legislative
sanctions. 268 Additionally, any contact that Jacobson had with the
child pornography market between his receipt of Bare Boys I and
Bare Boys II in February of 1984 and his arrest by Postal Service
inspectors in September of 1987 was, in truth, contact with the
government. Thus, the government had total control over the criminal
enterprise involved in this case.
Fourth, what was the impact of the government activity to create
the commission of the criminal activity? 269 The government had a
tremendous impact on the commission of this crime. "Had the Postal
Service left Jacobson alone, he would have, on the basis of his past
life, continued to be a law-abiding man, caring for his parents [sic],
farming his land and minding his own business. ' 270 Instead, the
government invested considerable time and money in encouraging
Jacobson to stand up for his rights by satisfying his questionable
appetite for pornographic materials which featured children engaging
in sexual acts. From the surrounding circumstances of this case, it
appears highly unlikely that Jacobson would have ever ordered any
other child pornography after his dissatisfaction with his legal purchases of Bare Boys I and Bare Boys II without the government
dangling such materials in front of him.

266. Johnson, 855 F.2d at 305.
267. Id.
268. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1538 (1992).
269. United States v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1988).
270. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 471 (8th Cir. 1990) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting).
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An analysis of the four factors from United States v. Johnson27 1
indicates that the government's conduct may have been sufficiently
offensive or egregious to shock the conscience of the Court. The
combination of a sympathetic criminal defendant, outrageous investigative overkill by the government, and a scintilla of evidence of his
predisposition outside of the government's investigation may have
served to exculpate Jacobson as a victim of circumstances. Balancing
the fact that child pornography is such a heinous crime with the fact
that it is so difficult to investigate, the Supreme Court may have
desired to avoid establishing parameters of acceptable government
conduct when operating undercover operations to apprehend child
pornographers. By claiming to have focused on Jacobson's lack of
predisposition, the Court effectively protected Jacobson's due process
rights without impairing the government's efforts to exterminate the
child pornography market in the United States.
Consistency with the subjective theory of entrapment as previously promulgated demanded that Jacobson's conviction be upheld
and his entrapment defense denied. The Supreme Court abandoned
the consistency of stare decisis in its reasoning by manipulating an
"analysis" to reach its desired result. Nonetheless, while disregarding
the importance of consistency with its past decisions on entrapment,
the Court made the correct determination. In short, Jacobson never
should have been prosecuted. He was only guilty of falling victim to
"one of the most outrageous examples of government behavior ' 272
which resulted in Jacobson losing his job as a school bus driver,
selling forty acres of the family farm to pay for his defense, and
publicizing his previously undisclosed homosexuality. Jacobson summed
up his ordeal by asking "[d]oesn't the government realize that they
can destroy a man's life? ' 273
IV.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

While Jacobson specifically involved an undercover investigation
into the child pornography market, its holding may impact a number
of other areas of law enforcement efforts by the government. The
government commonly uses undercover investigations to apprehend
individuals who are illegally involved in narcotics, gambling, prostitution, and firearms. 2 4 Therefore, Jacobson may seriously hamper
271. 855 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1988).
272. Marcus, supra note 12 (quoting Paul Marcus who is a Professor at the
University of Arizona College of Law).
273. Johnson, supra note 2.

274. Richard C. Donnelly, JudicialControl of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons,
and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951).
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the government's undercover investigations of these activities.
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor predicted a number of undesirable consequences would result from this decision. First, she stated
that the holding could be read as requiring the government to have
sufficient evidence of a defendant's predisposition before it ever seeks
to contact him. 275 Essentially, an implicit endorsement of the reasonable suspicion principle articulated in the Eighth Circuit's panel
opinion would narrow the government's power to initiate undercover
operations. The application of this standard to investigations of child
pornography would be devastating. In order for photos, films, or
videos of child pornography to be created, a child must be sexually
exploited. Furthermore, the psychological effects of child pornography
to its young victims is more damaging than prostitution or sexual
abuse because the victim must proceed through life with the haunting
knowledge that the photo, film, or video has been widely distributed
in this clandestine market.276 A reasonable suspicion requirement
would effectively restrict the government's ability to intervene to
protect children at risk. Instead, governmental intervention would
have to occur after children have already been sexually molested.
However, it is very doubtful that the Court would accept such an
implication because the majority specifically rejected the dissent's
attack and, more importantly, the Court has previously stated that
preventing sexual exploitation of children is a legitimate governmental
277
objective of "surpassing importance."
If the reasonable suspicion standard was applied in other circumstances, it would improperly allow the federal judiciary to make
unauthorized vetoes over law enforcement techniques which do not
rise to the level of violating due process but that the judiciary finds
disagreeable. Also, the reasonable suspicion requirement is inconsistent with Hampton. The Court wrote that due process comes into
issue when the government's conduct violated "some protected right
of the defendant. ' 27 There is no constitutional right to be free of
investigation. 279 Therefore, there is no foundation in the Constitution
for the reasonable suspicion requirement.
Second, Justice O'Connor felt that the holding of the Court
would require the government to prove more to show predisposition
275. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 1545 (1992).

276. David P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A
Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 535, 545 (1981).

277. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
278. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976).
279. United States v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 113 (1990).
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than it needs to prove for conviction.28 0 By her reading, the majority
requires the government to prove that a defendant accused under 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a) of receiving child pornography through the mail
knowingly violated the statute. Requiring the government to prove a
defendant's specific intent to break the law would have a chilling
effect on convictions. In such a troubling area as child pornography,
this potential implication is unacceptable. The Court specifically
rejected this concern. 281 Instead, the majority simply held that proof
of prior legal conduct and certain personal inclinations was not
sufficient to demonstrate that Jacobson had been predisposed to
commit the crime absent the government's actions. Therefore, it is
highly unlikely that this concern of the dissent will come to fruition.
By rejecting Justice O'Connor's concern about requiring proof
of the defendant's specific intent to engage in the unlawful activity,
the majority opened the courtroom doors to "protracted expert
psychiatric testimony addressing natural criminal propensities" of the
defendant. 212 If a defendant, ensnared in an undercover operation
which required an extended period of time for proper execution, had
no prior criminal record and an outstanding reputation for being a
honorable, law-abiding citizen, the defense will argue that the defendant had never harbored a criminal thought until the government
implanted the criminal seed by making such an attractive inducement
as to be irresistible. For example, an undercover operation is targeted
at a specific individual for whom the government possesses a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. Instead of soliciting the criminal act
from the targeted individual, an undercover agent mistakenly solicits
another person who, coincidentally, bears a striking resemblance to
the targeted individual. This individual commits the solicited criminal
act because, as defense counsel will argue at trial, the government's
solicitation of the criminal act was irresistible. To bolster the defense,
expert psychiatric testimony will be elicited to support the contention
that the accused had been victimized by the government's psychological warfare. Of course, the prosecution will counter with its own
experts. This psychiatric jousting will lengthen trials which will further
backup the already overcrowded docket of the federal courts. If the
dueling ends in a draw, the majority's decision would suggest that an
acquittal should be ordered by the court in this hypothetical scenario.
280 Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1546 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
281. Id. at 1542 n.3.
282. Bruce Fein, Hard Case . .. With Overbite, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1992,
at Fl.
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After a number of such acquittals have been publicized, the result
' 28 3
will be to "exacerbate public cynicism of the law.
Jacobson can easily be read as requiring the government to avoid
giving undercover operations any appearances other than of corruption and unlawfulness. 2 4 In other words, the government should not
appeal to a person's lawful instincts in attempting to induce unlawful
behavior.
Jacobson can also be read to bar a conviction resulting from the
government's relentless pursuit of a person who did not evince any
criminal inclination at the initial contact. 285 If an individual does not
clearly indicate a criminal intent at the time of the person's first
contact with the government's undercover investigation, the individual
should be removed from the government's list of targets. By removing
the non-inclined from the target list early in the investigatory process,
undercover operations will be able to concentrate their efforts on
those individuals that are most likely to be ensnared. Thus, smaller
target lists translate into less costs to the taxpayers for each operation.
Also, by concentrating its efforts, the government will increase its
conviction rate and, most importantly, the convictions will be of the
habitual offenders who persist in their efforts to make our streets
unsafe.
The majority's specific denials of any of the implications forwarded by Justice O'Connor's dissent, combined with the decision's
inconsistency with precedent, suggests that this case may be limited
to its facts. 286 In the Justice Department's official reaction, Assistant
Attorney General Robert S. Mueller III stated "[t]he Supreme Court
decision is generally limited to the facts of the Jacobson case ... the
decision will not affect the government's sting operations .... ,,287
However, if the lower federal courts do not seek to limit Jacobson to
283. Id.

284. Gregory J. Wallance, The Entrapment Defense After 'Jacobson,' N.Y. L.J.,
June 24, 1992, at 1.
285. Bennett L. Gershman, Entrapment Revisited, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1992, at
1.
286. One court distinguished its case on the basis that Jacobson involved a sting
operation in which the government made the initial contact. United States v. Payne,
962 F.2d 1228,1232 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992). Another court distinguished its case on the
basis that Jacobson involved a defendant who did not readily accept the government's

solicitation of the criminal act until the government had spent more than two years

pressuring the defendant to accept such a solicitation. United States v. Hart, 963
F.2d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 1992).
287. Justice Department Statement on Supreme Court's Ruling in Jacobson,
U.S. Newswire, Apr. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, USNWR File.
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its facts, its holding could have substantial and far-reaching implications on investigatory techniques employed by the government.
CONCLUSION

In Jacobson v. United States,"' the Supreme Court reviewed the
issue of entrapment for only the sixth time in its history: Additionally,
Jacobson was only the second time the Court found that a defendant
had been entrapped as a matter of law.
The decision is troubling in two respects. First, the analysis used
in Sherman v. United States,2 s 9 the only other case in which the Court
found entrapment as a matter of law, would suggest an outcome
opposite to the Court's final disposition of this case. Second, by
manipulating its analysis to focus on the government's conduct, the
majority implicitly applied an objective test of entrapment which the
Court has vehemently rejected throughout its entrapment decisions
or, alternatively, the Court tacitly determined that Jacobson's due
process rights had been violated which is a concept the Court has also
consistently spurned in its past decisions.
This decision will impact criminal investigations and prosecutions
in a number of ways. Since the Court emphasized the offensiveness
of the sting operation's appearance of legality, undercover operations
will have to carefully avoid purporting to be anything but illegal and
corrupt. Additionally, by requiring proof of a defendant's predisposition independent of evidence gathered during the government's sting
operation, the Court has narrowed the government's ability to initiate
undercover operations by, for all practical purposes, requiring the
government to possess reasonable suspicion that the defendant was
engaging in the illegal behavior before the defendant was actually
targeted in the sting operation.
Although the defense of entrapment has been recognized by the
Supreme Court for over sixty years, the doctrinal principles are still
being shaped. Thus, entrapment is an area that will probably receive
increasing attention in the future from the Court until entrapment's
doctrinal principles are established more definitively.
Hopefully, the future cases reviewed by the Supreme Court will
be done in a manner consistent with the precedent of Sherman and
not resemble the manipulated analysis of Jacobson. Without more
distinctive direction from the Court, the lower federal courts will
continue to struggle with constructing a discernible pattern of prece288. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
289. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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467

dent to create uniformity in the very inconsistent doctrinal confines
of entrapment.
Since Jacobson is inconsistent with the reasoning of Sherman,
either the Court should overrule one of these cases or the Court
should attempt to reconcile the two holdings. From the special circumstances in Jacobson, the Supreme Court should seek to reaffirm
Sherman by limiting Jacobson to its facts.
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